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Abstract
It is generally believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible, due to
widespread acceptance of an impossibility proof that utilizes quantum entaglement cheating. In
this paper, we delineate how the impossibiliy proof formulation misses various types of quantum
bit commitment protocols based on two-way quantum communications. We point out some of
the gaps in the impossibility proof reasoning, and present corresponding counterexamples. Four
different types of bit commitment protocols are constructed with several new protocol techniques.
A specific Type 4 protocol is described and proved unconditionally secure. Security analysis of a
Type 1 protocol and a Type 2 protocol are also sketched. The security of Type 3 protocols is as
yet open. A development of quantum statistical decision theory and quantum games is needed to
provie a complete security analysis of many such protocols.
∗E-mail: yuen@ece.northwestern.edu
†Note: this paper analyzes in detail, for the first time, the various gaps in the QBC impossibility proof,
many of which I indicated before but few of which seem to be understood. There is clearly a need to focus
on these gaps, which is an issue logically distinct from whether any protocol can be proved unconditionally
secure. One of the original three protocols I described in the QCM at Capri, July 2000, protocol Y3 that
appeared as QBC1 in v2 of this paper, was pointed out to be insecure in the QCM at MIT, July 2002.
It is extended, with the same underlying idea, and renamed QBC4 in this v3 with a full security proof. A
considerable amount of new material is also added, including a protocol based on cheating detection alone
and clarifications on unknown parameters and entanglement purification. It is also stressed that a priori
there can be no impossibility proof without a QBC definition.
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1 Introduction
There is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility of secure quantum bit
commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type
entanglement cheating which supposedly rules out QBC and other quantum protocols that
have been proposed for various cryptographic objectives [1]. In a bit commitment scheme,
one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen
a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam would open the commitment by
revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed bit with the
evidence in her possession, which she can verify. The usual concrete example is for Adam to
write down the bit on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe to be given to Babe,
while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment.
The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it, and hence the
bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should not be able
to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to cheat
successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a
trusted third party, or by invoking an unproved assumption concerning the complexity of
certain computational problems. By utilizing quantum effects, specifically the intrinsic un-
certainty of a quantum state, various QBC schemes not involving a third party have been
proposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe could cheat
with any significant probability of success as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a sup-
posedly general proof of the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC, and the insecurity
of previously proposed protocols, was presented [2]-[6]. Henceforth it has been generally
accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of principle
[7]-[11].
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases
of equal and unequal density operators that Babe has for the two different bit values. The
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proof purports to show that if Babe’s cussessful cheating probability PBc is close to the
value 1/2, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Adam’s successful
cheating probability PAc is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger than the mere
impossibility of unconditional security, namely that it is impossible to have both PBc ∼ 1/2
and PAc ∼ 0. The impossibility proof describes the EPR attack on a specific type of protocols,
and then argues that all possible QBC protocols are of this type.
Typically, one would expect that a proof of impossibility of carrying out some thing
X would show that any possible way of doing X would entail a feature that is logically
contradictory to given principles, as, for example, in the cases of quantum no-cloning [12, 13]
and von Neumann’s no-hidden-variable theorem [14]. In the present case, one may expect a
proof which shows, e.g., that any QBC protocol that is concealing is necessarily not binding.
It is important for this purpose that the framework of QBC protocol formulation is all-
inclusive. In the absence of a proof that all possible QBC protocols have been included in its
formulation, any impossibility proof is at best incomplete. Indeed, in the QBC impossibility
proof, only certain techniques of protocol design, such as the use of classical random numbers
in a quantum protocol, are included in its formulation without showing that all possible
techniques have been included. In this paper, we will describe several new techniques that
are not accounted for in the impossibility proof formulation.
There are two related assertions in the impossibility proof that are crucial to both its
claim of universality in general, and its specific claim of covering the use of random numbers
in particular. These are the assertions that all measurements in the commitment phase of
a quantum protocol can be postponed until the opening and the verification phases, and
that classical random numbers can be equivalently described by pure quantum states, via
quantum purification or the doctrine of “Church of the Larger Hilbert Space.” In this paper,
we will extensively analyze the serious problems associated with these assertions.
The essential argument of the general impossiblity proof is described in Section 2, and
some of its problems are indicated in Section 3. A proper framework for QBC protocols is
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discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe several new protocol techniques that lead
to the development of four new types of protocols not covered by the impossibility proof.
In Section 6 we describe Type 1 protocols, in which the postponement of a measurement
until opening and verification would yield a protocol with different cheating performance. A
specific protocol QBC1 is presented with a sketch of the security proof. In Section 7, the
logic underlying Type 2 protocols is delineated. A specific protocol, QBC2A, is presented
with an outline of the security proof. The security analysis of protocols QBC1 and QBC2A
are not complete in the sense that exact optimality can only be proved with a sequential
quantum decision theory yet to be developed, althought all essential points are included
under the assumption that no party can cheat if it can be detected with a nonvanishing
probability before a bit is committed. In Section 8, the widely accepted equivalence between
classical randomness and quantum purification is analyzed. We will show that they are not
equivalent in bit commitment. We also introduce Type 3 protocols, the security status of
which is yet undecided. In Section 9, we introduce Type 4 protocols which involve Babe’s
open questions related to Adam’s committed evidence. A specific protocol QBC4 is proved
unconditionally secure. The last Section 10 contains a brief summary of the main points.
The appendices, especially Appendix B, are an integral part of the paper, being separated for
convenient organization of this rather sutble and multi-faceted subject. Also, the different
types of protocols in this paper are not mutually exclusive. Again, they are mainly introduced
for the purposes of organization.
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2 The impossibility proof: Type 0 protocols
The impossibility proof, in its claimed generality, has never been systematically spelled out
in one place, but the essential ideas that constitute this proof are generally agreed upon [3]-
[11]. The formulation and the proof can be cast as follows. Adam and Babe have available
to them two-way quantum communications that terminate in a finite number of exchanges,
during which either party can perform any operation allowed by the laws of quantum physics,
all processes ideally accomplished with no imperfection of any kind. During these exchanges,
Adam would have committed a bit with associated evidence to Babe. It is argued that, at
the end of the commitment phase, there is an entangled pure state |Φb〉, b ∈ {0, 1}, shared
between Adam who possesses state space HA, and Babe who possesses HB. For example, if
Adam sends Babe one of M possible states {|φbi〉} for bit b with probability pbi, then
|Φb〉 =
∑
i
√
pbi|ei〉|φbi〉 (1)
with orthonormal |ei〉 ∈ HA and given |φbi〉 ∈ HB. Adam would open by making a measure-
ment on HA, say {|ei〉}, communicating to Babe his result i0 and b; then Babe would verify
by measuring the corresponding projector |φbi0〉〈φbi0| on HB, accepting as correct only the
result 1.
More generally, when classical random numbers known only to one party are used in the
commitment, they are to be replaced by corresponding quantum entanglement purification.
The commitment of |φbi〉 with probability pbi in (1) is, in fact, an example of such purification.
An example involving Babe is an anonymous state protocol [15]-[16] where |φbi〉 in (1) is to
be obtained by Adam applying unitary operations Ubi on state |ψk〉 ∈ HB1 sent to him by
Babe with probability λk, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Generally, for any random k used by Babe, it is
argued that from the doctrine of the “Church of the Larger Hilbert Space” [10], it is to be
replaced by the purification |Ψ〉 in HB1 ⊗HB2 ,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉|fk〉, (2)
6
where the |fk〉′s are complete orthonormal in HB2 kept by Babe while HB1 would be sent
to Adam. With such purification, it is claimed that any protocol involving classical secret
parameters would become quantum-mechanically determinate, i.e., the shared state |Φb〉 at
the end of commitment is completely known to both parties. Note that, from (2), this means
that both {λk} and {|fk〉} are taken to be known exactly to both Babe and Adam.
Why should Adam and Babe share a pure state instead of a mixed one at the end
of commitment? One key ingredient of the impossibility proof is the use of measurement
purification, or quantum computers, in lieu of actually taking macroscopic measurement
readings. During commitment, quantum registers holding the measurement results would
be passed along instead. Furthermore, any measurement followed by a unitary operation
Ul depending on the measurement result l would be equivalently described by an overall
unitary operator. Thus, if the orthonormal {|gl〉} on HC1 is measured with result l, and then
Ul operates on HC2 , it is equivalent to the unitary operation
U =
∑
l
|gl〉〈gl| ⊗ Ul (3)
on HC1 ⊗ HC2 . It is claimed that any actual measurement during commitment can be
postponed until the opening and the verification phases of the protocol without affecting
the protocol in any essential way. In order to maintain quantum determinacy, the exact
{|gl〉} in (3) are taken to be known to both parties, even though the measurement may be
chosen by a party among different possible alternatives. Let us use k to denote Babe’s secret
parameter, and i to denote Adam’s secret parameter, such as the i with probabilities {pi}
in (1). These crucial assumptions of openly known {pi}, {λk}, {|fk〉}, and {|gl〉} are made
in the impossibility proof through the use of known fixed quantum computers or quantum
machines for data storage and processing by either party [3], [6], [9, Appendix], even though
the control of such machines belongs only to one of the parties.
Generally, Babe can try to identify the bit from ρB
b
, the marginal state of |Φb〉 on HB, by
performing an optimal quantum measurement that yields the optimal cheating probability
P¯Bc for her. Adam cheats by committing |Φ0〉 and making a measurement on HA to open i0
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and b = 1. His probability of successful cheating is computed through |Φb〉, his particular
measurement, and Babe’s verifying measurement; the one optimized over all of his possible
actions will be denoted P¯Ac . For a fixed measurement basis, Adam’s cheating can be described
by a unitary operator UA onHA. Thus, his general EPR attack goes as follows. For a general
protocol, the shared state |Φb〉 at the end of commitment is not necessarily of the form (1),
but is nevertheless an openly known pure state on HA ⊗ HB. If the protocol is perfectly
concealing, i.e, P¯Bc = 1/2, then ρ
B
0
= ρB
1
. By writing |Φb〉 as the Schmidt decomposition on
HA ⊗HB,
|Φb〉 =
∑
j
√
p˜j |e˜bj〉|φ˜j〉, (4)
where |φ˜j〉 are the eigenvectors of ρBb and {|e˜bj〉} for each b are complete orthonormal in
HA, it follows that Adam can obtain |Φ1〉 from |Φ0〉 by a local cheating transformation UA
that brings {|e0j〉} to {|e1j〉}. Whatever operations he needs to perform to open, which
may involve identifying his previous operation rather than a state on HB, can be carried
out accordingly after the cheating transformation. Thus his optimum cheating probability
is P¯Ac = 1 in this case.
For unconditional, rather than perfect, security, one demands that both cheating prob-
abilities P¯Bc − 1/2 and P¯Ac can be made arbitarily small when a security parameter n is
increased [3]. Thus, unconditional security is quantitatively expressed as
(US) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
, lim
n
P¯Ac = 0. (5)
The condition (5) says that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n0 such that for all n > n0,
P¯Bc − 1/2 < ǫ and P¯Ac < ǫ, to which we may refer as ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding. These
cheating probabilities are to be computed purely on the basis of logical and physical laws,
and thus would survive any change in technology, including an increase in computational
power. In general, one can write down explicitly
P¯Bc =
1
4
(
2 + ‖ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1
)
, (6)
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where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm, ‖τ‖1 ≡ tr(τ †τ)1/2 for a trace-class operator τ , but the
corresponding P¯Ac is more involved. Nevertheless, the impossibility proof shows that Adam
can find a cheating UA that yields
(IP) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
⇒ lim
n
P¯Ac = 1 (7)
within its formulation [2, 15]. Note that the impossibility proof makes a stronger statement
(IP) than the mere impossibility of (US), i.e., (7) is stronger than (5) not being possible.
There are various gaps and implicit assumptions hidden in the impossibility proof, many
of which seem to spring from the idea that a protocol leads to a closed quantum system all
by itself, requiring no interaction with external agents or preparers. These gaps render the
proof incomplete in several ways. As to be discussed in the following, some of them can be
partially justified or closed, but many still remain and cannot be bridged. We will refer to
protocols that fit this impossibility proof formulation as Type 0 protocols, and will describe
four additional types, 1, 2, 3, and 4, that are clearly not covered by this proof. Before
proceeding, we first elaborate on the limited scope of the impossibility proof formulation.
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3 Problems of the impossibility proof
A plausible first reaction to the impossibility proof is: why are all possible QBC protocols
reducible to the formulation described in the last section? More precisely, how may one
characterize quantitatively the necessary feature of an unconditionally secure QBC protocol
in order to show it to be impossible? To put this in yet another way, what is the mathematical
definition of a QBC protocol, or the mathematical statement of the necesary feature of
an unconditionally secure QBC protocol, that is required for any proof of a mathematical
theorem that says such protocol is impossible? No such definition is available. The situation
is similar to the lack of a definition of an “effectively computable” function. Since nobody
calls the Church-Turing thesis the Church-Turing theorem, at best the impossibility proof is
a “thesis” which may be found incorrect in the future. This a priori logical point is further
elaborated in Appendix A.
The crucial starting point of the impossibility proof asserts that, in general, a protocol is
equivalent to one with openly known pure states |Φb〉 onHA⊗HB at the end of commitment.
Let us explore what this entails. Suppose Adam commits, in a prescribed protocol, one
of M possible |φbi〉 for each b without entanglement.† Then ρB0 is identical or close to
ρB1 as before, but Adam cannot cheat. This situation is not one where a pure |Φb〉 is
known to Babe, which occurs only when all the randomness on ρB0 comes from quantum
entanglement. Even then Adam can cheat only if the entanglement is controlled by him.
Indeed, quantum entanglement is not a conceptual resource, but rather a physical one,
and needs to be physically established. See Appendix B for a discussion on randomness
generated by quantum entanglement versus that generated by other means, and the confusion
surrounding the doctrine of “Church of the Larger Hilbert Space.” There may exist protocols
in which Adam is forced to generate randomness without being able to entangle over it during
the course of commitment, so that at the end of commitment one has the situation described
†In practice, this is what would happen currently due to the difficulties of generating and maintaining
entanglement. Some of these difficulties are not merely technical, but are actually inherent in principle.
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above instead of openly known |Φb〉 on HA ⊗ HB. In our Type 4 protocols, the protocol
design technique of open questioning of evidence could be used to achieve this situation, as
described in Section 9 and Appendix C.
In general, if Babe makes an actual measurement during commitment, there would not
be an openly known |Φb〉 at the end of commitment. The impossibility proof claims that
such measurement can be postponed until after commitment with the use of measurement
purification and (3) in place of an actual measurement. However, no proof is given that
both P¯Ac and P¯
B
c would not be affected. Furthermore, one has to make sure that it is
not the microscopic states Babe is thus required to store her measurement results that are
being reversed by Adam’s cheating. Otherwise, Babe can take macroscopic readings instead.
In Section 5, we will show how cheating detection during commitment is not incorporated
in the impossibility proof formulation with an openly known |Φb〉. As a consequence, the
situation of actual measurements during commitment has to be explicitly included in a
general formulation of QBC protocols.
The use of anonymous states (2) alone, where {λk} may be unknown to Adam, leads to
our Type 3 protocols. As elaborated in Appendix B, the distinction between an unknown
and a random parameter is crucial in this sutiation, and the assertion that |Φb〉 is openly
known cannot be maintainted. A theory of statistical quantum games is required for an
analysis of protocols of this type.
Assuming that |Φb〉 is openly known at the end of commitment, it is still not proved
that Adam can cheat in general because special structure or mingling of HA and HB during
commitment may lead to an opening and verification procedure different from Adam and
Babe acting on HA and HB separately. Our Type 2 protocols give one such possibility, but
no doubt there are others. Generally in a QBC protocol with a given |Φb〉 at the end of
commitment, different opening and verification strategies are possible, depending on exactly
how |Φb〉 is arrived at. Both our Type 2 and Type 4 protocols may be viewed as ones where
these phases are more complex than the one given in the formulation of the impossibility
11
proof. In the next section we will first elaborate on the issue of what may constitute a QBC
protocol and whether we can give it a mathematical definition.
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4 Proper framework for protocol formulation
The following two principles, the Intent Principle and the Libertarian Principle, govern the
viability and meaningfulness of any bit commitment protocol in a descriptive, not normative,
sense. That is, they would be satisfied in what we would take intuitively to be a proper
protocol, and are not imposed in a legislative fashion, as discussed in the following.
INTENT PRINCIPLE — Each party would act to achieve the intent of the pro-
tocol if no cheating by the other party is (probabilistically) possible.
Thus, each party would cooperate so that the protocol would not be aborted, which
happens when one party is found cheating by the other through a possible cheat-detection
mechanism during the commitment phase. Since each party can always just abort by nonco-
operation during any stage of any two-party protocol, the Intent Principle does not exclude
any action not otherwise possible. Thus, if the cheating detection probability leads to an
overall cheating success probability within the given ǫ, the protocol is a proper one and
cannot be declared illegitimate because one party may keep cheating, though keep being
detected.
We also have the
LIBERTARIAN PRINCIPLE — At any stage of the protocol, each party can
freely perform any possible local operation consistent with the Intent Principle for
cooperation.
Thus, no party can be assumed to be honest in anything if the action leads to his/her own
advantage and would not get caught. That is, each party can cheat whenever possible, unless
it violates the Intent Principle for cooperation. There would be no need for any protocol
if the parties can be assumed honest. Similarly, each party can do whatever is possible to
thwart the other party’s cheating. Under the Intent Principle, a party is obliged to accept a
protocol if he is assured that the probability of cheating against him is within the tolerance
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level ǫ, even though he does not know a secret parameter of the other party. The following
Secrecy Principle is a corollary of the above two principles.
Corollary (SECRECY PRINCIPLE) — A party does not need to reveal a secret
parameter chosen by her in whatever manner, if it does not affect the other party’s
security.
On the other hand, if a party has no control or checking on a secret parameter that the other
party may use to cheat successfuly, she would not accept the protocol.
Any finite sequence of two-way quantum communication exchanges that results in bit
commitment under the Intent Principle is evidently a QBC protocol, whose security is to
be analyzed under the Libertarian Principle. More importantly, any QBC formulation that
fails to include all such sequences does not capture all possible QBC protocols. The present
framework is more general than the “Yao model” [17, 6] in that aborting the protocol on the
basis of cheating detection is allowed during commitment, and is more specific in the explicit
formulation of the above principles. As discussed in the preceding section, the impossibility
proof formulation is not complete in that it misses protocols with cheating detection during
commitment because such detection would involve actual measurements that may not be
postponed until after commitment to yield openly known |Φb〉. Also, the Secrecy Principle
a priori contradicts directly the claim of openly known |Φb〉.
The above principles do not constitute a mathematical definition of a QBC protocol.
They are too broad and too narrow at the same time — too broad in the sense that bit com-
mitment is not defined, and too narrow in that other possibilities may still exist. My personal
suspicion is that the “too broad” problem, or the difficulty of defining bit commitment, is
much more serious than the “too narrow” problem.
As in all QBC formulations so far, it is assumed in this paper that Adam opens perfectly
on one bit value, say b = 0. More generally, one may allow QBC protocols that open on one
bit with a success probability P0 = 1− ǫ′ for a small ǫ′. It appears that protocols for which
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neither bit can be opened with near-unity probability are of little interest. In conjunction
with ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding, one may then consider the possibility of (ǫ, ǫ′)-protocols,
the detailed treatment of which will be given elsewhere.
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5 New protocol techniques, or gaps in the impossiblity
proof
In this section we describe three new techniques for constructing QBC protocols, which are
not covered by the impossibility proof formulation. Our Type 1 protocol is based on the
first technique, Type 2 on the second and, possibly, additional others, Type 3 on random
numbers, and Type 4 on the third technique. Each of these protocol types will be discussed
separately in the following sections.
The first technique introduces testing on states of an ensemble, in space or in time,
submitted by the other party, in order to check whether only admissible states of the protocol
are being used. This was already utilized in QBC2 of Ref. [15]. The protocol is aborted
if cheating is detected by a measurement. Such protocols are allowed under the Intent
Principle, but not included in the impossibility proof formulation for the following reason.
Babe can use many different possible Ul in (3), secretly chosen to be recognized only by her,
in order to represent her choice of aborting the protocol. Thus, the resulting |Φb〉 is not
known to Adam. Even if the measurement checking is postponed until verification, there is
no proof that the cases of Adam’s successful cheating do not correspond to the ones aborted
by Babe. That is, a careful analysis of the overlaps between aborting probabilities by Adam
and Babe with P¯Ac and P¯
B
c is required. One also has to rule out the situation where one keeps
aborting if he finds the situation not conducive to his cheating. Generally, in accordance
with the Intent Principle, a fixed number Nc of cheating detections may be built into the
protocol, beyond which the whole attempt at a protocol is aborted. An appropriate theory
of statistical quantum games needs to be developed for general analysis of such protocols.
For the second technique, consider a protocol in which Babe forms (2) and sends Adam
HB1 , with |ψk〉 = |ψk1〉|ψk2〉 in HB1 = HB11 ⊗ HB12 . Adam randomly switches the state in
HB11 to be that of |ψk1〉 or |ψk2〉 by the unitary perumation Pm, m ∈ {1, 2}, modulates the
resulting state in HB11 by a single Ub for each b, and sends it to Babe. He opens by revealing
b, his random permuation Pm, and returning HB12 . Babe verifies by testing the apropriate
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states in HB11 for checking b, and HB12 for checking that there is no change. Thus, Adam
cannot entangle and use HB12 . It is possible that the protocol is both concealing and binding
because, for the final commitment state |Φb〉 with Adam entangling the Pm with |ei〉 ∈ HA1 ,
we have HA = HA1 ⊗ HB12 and HB = HB11 ⊗ HB12 . Thus, ρB0 can be close to ρB1 because
HB12 ⊗HB13 is not available to Babe for her cheating. However, only HA1, and not HA, is
avaiable to Adam’s cheating, so he cannot apply the required cheating UA without being
found cheating with a nonvanishing probability. There is no impossibility proof covering this
situation.
Example 1 (protocol QBCp2)
As a specific example, consider the case HB1 = HB11 ⊗HB12 ⊗HB13 ⊗HB14 of four qubits,
with {|ψk〉} = {|1〉|2〉|3〉|4〉, |4〉|1〉|2〉|3〉, |3〉|4〉|1〉|2〉, |2〉|3〉|4〉|1〉}, where {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉} are,
e.g., a fixed set S0 of four possible BB84 states on a given great circle of a qubit. Adam
permutes each |ψk〉 by one of four possible Pm, and returns the first qubit to Babe unchanged
for b = 0, while shifted by π/2 in the great circie for b = 1. Assume first that Babe either did
not entangle, or cannot use her entanglement in HB2 , so that Adam receives one of the four
possible |ψk〉. It is then easy to see that ρB110 (ψk) = ρB111 (ψk) for all k. It is also not hard to
see that no entanglement of the four possible Pm would produce a rotation on the first qubit
while not disturbing the others. Thus, Adam cannot cheat perfectly and has a fixed P¯Ac for
this protocol which is not arbitrarily close to one, even though it is perfectly concealing. In
Section 7, we will indicate how Babe can be effectively denied her use of entanglement via
HB2 .
In the third technique, Babe asks Adam some of infinitely many possible questions con-
cerning the evidence that Adam committed, demanding the answers to be presented to her in
a random fashion, specified by her as a quantum code. Since Adam cannot entangle this new
random code on top of the entanglement he already formed, he could only cheat successfully
if the required presentations of the answers have been pre-entangled by him. However, he
17
can pre-entangle answers to only a finite number of questions, and thus can only cheat with
an arbitrarily small probability.
Each of these techniques will now be elaborated upon in the different types of protocols.
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6 Some measurements cannot be postponed: Type 1
protocols
In this Section we will show that the protocol technique of testing for cheating detection
alone, with resulting protocols referred to as Type 1, could already lead to unconditional
security. The general idea leading to our protocol QBC1 would be first described before
security analysis and a precise statement of the protocol.
If carried out honestly, the protocol would work as follows. Adam sends Babe a large
number n of qubits named by their temporal position with states selected randomly and
independently from the set S0 of four BB84 states on a given fixed great circle C of the
qubits. Babe randomly selects n− n0 qubits, tests them by asking Adam what these states
are, and verifies them, with n and n0 large so that the remaining n0 states would also be
distributed nearly uniformly on S0. She then picks randomly one of the remaining n0 states
and sends it Back to Adam who would modulate it by U0 = I or U1 = R(π), rotation by π
radians on the circle C, depending on b = 0 or 1. He opens by revealing b and all the n0
qubit states. Babe verifies by checking all the qubits in her possession. This protocol QBC1
is ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding for the following reasons.
Adam may entangle each individual qubit he sends in the form (2) with |ψk〉 ∈ S0, and
then measure {|fk〉} when asked to reveal by Babe. If he sends in other qubit states, the
chance ǫA
1
he would escape detection is arbitrarily small for large n−n0. If he entangles across
qubits, that merely reduces his freedom in response to Babe’s testing. When he accepts the
qubit sent back by Babe, he would have to measure {|fk〉} in all the remaining qubits before
his modulation, or else he could not commit because there would be no difference between his
two Ub actions. If he measures on the qubit sent back by Babe, he would not be able to open
perfectly for b = 0. More significantly, the information is of little use to him since he does
not know the name of that qubit. He can only cheat by declaring b = 1 and switching the
names of some of the qubits, hoping that it would fit his cheating b = 1 opening. However,
the chance that would succeed without being detected can be seen to be arbitrarily small
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for large n0.
This protocol is ǫ-concealing because all of Babe’s possible cheatings would be unsuc-
cessful as follows. With a high probability, Adam checks the qubit sent back by Babe with
a question on its name, and verifies it is correct. He would accept the qubit at some point.
If Babe sends in a state different from one in Adam’s ensemble, the probability that would
not get detected is arbitrarily small when Adam tests a large number m ≪ n0 of times.
Assuming that both Adam and Babe employ a randomized strategy applied independently
from qubit to qubit during Adam’s testing, it can be readily shown that the protocol is ǫ-
concealing and ǫ-binding for sufficiently large n and n0. This different-state attack by Babe
includes her possible entanglement, even though it can be shown independently that her
entanglement would not help. She can also try to determine the qubit state she sends back
by measuring the other qubits in her possession, but these are not correlated to the qubit
she sends back. We have the folowing protocol QBC1.
PROTOCOL QBC1
(i) Adam sends Babe a large number n of independent qubit states drawn
randomly from S0, a set of openly known BB84 states on a given
great circle C of the qubits. The qubits are named by their temporal
positions as received by Babe.
(ii) Babe randomly picks a large number n0 of these qubits, sets them
aside, and asks Adam to open the remaining ones. She verifies them
to be correct and distributed nearly uniformly, as prescribed in (i).
Otherwise the protocol is aborted.
(iii) Babe sends back one of the n0 remaining qubits to Adam, who checks
it a sufficient number of times in a game with Babe, accepts one, and
modulates it by either U0 = I or U1 = R(pi), rotation by pi radians on
C, and sends it back to Babe.
(iv) Adam opens by revealing b and all the remaining qubit states. Babe
verifies by measuring the corresponding projectors.
In addition to being an outline, the above security analysis is incomplete because the
optimal sequential decision in both Adam’s and Babe’s testing have not been analyzed. A
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new development of quantum sequential decision theory and quantum games is needed for
such an analysis. In general, a fixed number Nc of cheatings by each party is allowed as a
protocol design parameter in a quantum game situation. A party is not permitted, i.e., loses
the game, if found cheating more than Nc times. It is evident that QBC1 is unconditionally
secure if Nc is taken to be zero or a small number. I believe that, for any given Nc, n and
n0 can be chosen so that the protocol is unconditionally secure for any ǫ > 0.
Note that QBC1 is not just a cheat-sensitive [18] protocol. In particular, the cheat
detection is done before the bit is committed. As shown in the preceding section, it would
not be equivalent to a protocol with an openly known |Φb〉 at the end of commitment.
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7 Who has which space: Type 2 protocols
The use of the first technique in Section 5, test for cheating via measurement, has the effect
of changing and pinning down the ǫ-concealing condition of the protocol, as compared to
one without the test. Generally, the condition
ρB
0
(Ψ)
ǫ∼ ρB
1
(Ψ) for one |Ψ〉 ∈ HB1 ⊗HB2 , (8)
while weaker than
ρB0 (Ψ)
ǫ∼ ρB1 (Ψ) for every |Ψ〉 ∈ HB1 ⊗HB2 , (9)
is not equivalent to
ρB0 (ψk)
ǫ∼ ρB1 (ψk) ∀ |ψk〉 ∈ HB1 . (10)
Specifically, (8) does not imply (10) because there can be a |ψ1〉 for which ρB0 (ψ1) and ρB1 (ψ1)
are far apart under (8) with λ1 small [16]. Also, it is easy to check that, in Example 1 of
Section 5, (10) holds with equality, but there is a finite gap for ‖ρB
0
−ρB
1
‖1 upon entanglement
with HB2 . This renders false the claim that the use of random numbers as in (10) can be
equivalently described by their quantum purifications as in (8). Further discussion os this
point is given in Section 9. Here we note that (9) is, in general, a sufficient but not necessary
(at least not having been proved necessary) condition for the protocol to be concealing, again
to be further discussed in Section 9. It is rather a severe restriction on the protocol that can
be relaxed to (8) with test for cheating.
A Type 2 protocol involving also the first technique of cheating detection may work as
follows. Similar to QBC1, a large n-sequence (n-fold tensor product) of qubit states, drawn
independently with probability λk from a fixed set S0 = {|ψk〉}, would be sent from Babe
to Adam, each state named by its position in the sequence. Adam puts aside randomly
chosen n0 of them, and asks Babe to reveal the remaining n − n0 ones for testing. For
large enough n − n0, Babe cannot use any |Ψ〉 ∈ HB1 ⊗ HB2 other than that of the form
22
(2) without getting caught with probability arbitrarily close to one, so that the concealing
condition is (8), and not (9). If Adam randomly picks one of the remainng n0, or m for
full unconditional security, modulates it by a single Ub for each b, and return it without the
name to Babe, she would not be able to use her entanglement (8) effectively on any qubit.
This technique is similar to the use of decoy states from Adam to Babe in [16], and results
in an effective concealing condition (10) in place of (8), although (8) still applies overall.
While the use of a single Ub does not allow Adam to cheat successfully on a fixed qubit, the
freedom from the n0-ensemble still allows him to entangle and launch an EPR attack. This
attack is thwarted via the second technique of Section 5, which demands that Adam return
the remaining n0− 1 qubits so Babe can verify that they have not been disturbed. Example
1, our protocol QBCp2, can be extended in this way to become an unconditionally secure
protocol QBC2, which is a modified version of a protocol with the same name in Ref. [15].
Alternatively, the same logic applies to the following protocol, which is somewhat simpler.
PROTOCOL QBC2A
(i) Babe sends Adam n qubits named by their temporal position, each
drawn independently with equal probability from S0, a fixed set of
four possible BB84 states.
(ii) Adam randomly picks n0 of these qubits and sets them aside, and asks
Babe to open the remaining n−n0 ones. He verifies them to be correct
in that they are distributed as prescribed in step (i). Otherwise the
protocol is aborted.
(iii) Adam randomly picks m out of the n0 remaining ones, modulates each
by the same U0 = I or U1 = R(pi), rotation by pi on the great circle
containing S0, and sends them back to Babe.
(iv) Adam opens by revealing b and returning the remaining n0−m qubits.
Babe verifies by measuring the corresponding projectors.
By proper choice of m, n0, and n, this protocol can be made both ǫ-concealing and ǫ-
binding for any ǫ > 0, given that Adam opens perfectly on b = 0. The main steps of the
proof may be outlined as follows. Babe can cheat by entangling over each individual qubit
and also by using a distribution of qubits more biased than the one presented in step (i). To
defeat her qubit entanglement cheating, let n0/n = ǫ1. The probability that she would pair
HB11 with the correct HB21 , where HB = HB1⊗HB2 , HBm = HBm1⊗ . . .⊗HBmn , m ∈ {1, 2},
is thus ǫ1. If the pairing is incorrect, the trace distance in (7) is not affected because, for
any three general states ρ, ρ′, σ,
‖(ρ− ρ′)⊗ σ‖1 = ‖ρ− ρ′‖1. (11)
If the pairing is correct, we take the upper bound value of two for the trace distance. By
making both n0 and n large and testing on the arbitrary n− n0 qubits, one may guarantee,
to within any ǫ2 > 0 for the resulting P
B
c = 1/2 + ǫ2 with ǫ2 → 0 in the limit n0 → ∞ and
n→∞, that the distribution of states in the two sets of qubits is indeed the one prescribed.
Accordingly, Babe can only get PBc = 1/2 + ǫ3 for ǫ3 → 0 from the m committed qubits
for any fixed m. This situation has been analyzed for QBC2 in Ref. [15]. From the union
bound on probability, one may take ǫ1 + ǫ2+ ǫ3 ≤ ǫ, and the protocol becomes ǫ-concealing.
The asymptotic situation at m,n0, n → ∞ is quite apparent even in the absence of any
quantification with respect to the ǫ’s. The protocol is binding on Adam, because m can be
chosen large enough so that Adam’s optimum one-qubit cheating probability pA becomes
pmA ≤ ǫ.
This QBC2A utilizes the first technique and denial of entanglement matching, in addi-
tion to its use of the second technique, which makes it Type 2. Even though there is yet no
example, one cannot a priori rule out the possibility that the use of the second technique
alone, as described in Section 5, would lead to an unconditionally secure protocol. Even
if that turns out to be impossible, the impossibility proof formulation does not cover such
situation, and need to be extended for a proof.
24
8 Classical randomness and quantum purification: Type
3 protocols
A cornerstone of the general impossibility proof is the assertion that classical randomness can
be equivalently described as quantum determinacy via purification, say by (2), through the
doctrine of “Church of the Larger Hilbert Space,” a technique also widely used in quantum
coin tossing. But equivalent for what? In the following, we analyze the ways in which they
are not equivalent for use by Babe in a QBC protocol. The best argument I know for their
equivalence would be given alongside. Appendix B is essential for clarification of this issue.
First of all, it is clearly not true that all classical randomness can be reduced to that
arising from quantum description of a system. After all, there were many scenarios for the
occurrence of classical randomness before the rise of quantum physics, including especially
classical statistical mechanics. Even if one grants a determinate quantum description for the
underlying classical randomness involved, it is unreasonable to assume that any party would
possess the detailed knowledge to write down the complete quantum description. However,
in the context of QBC protocols, it is not only reasonable, but, in fact, mandatory to consider
such purification (2) for which a party can form and use such purification for cheating. Thus
it is a consideration of entanglement cheating, not the “Church of the Larger Hilbert Space,”
that compels one to consider (2).
The following argument, in the spirit of the impossibility proof, appears to show that
the exact {|fk〉} in (2) need not be known by Adam for finding his cheating transformation.
Let the protocol be ǫ-concealing as a consequence of ρB
0
(Ψ) being close to ρB
1
(Ψ) for one |Ψ〉
generated by Babe in the form (2). Assume Babe verifies by first measuring {|fk〉} and then
checking Adam’s opening. The commutativity of Adam’s and Babe’s operations shows that
the protocol performance is the same whether Babe measures {|fk〉} during commitment or
after Adam opens. The fact that Adam can cheat after Babe measures {|fk〉} shows that the
cheating must be independent of the specific {|fk〉}, even though it is obtained for a known
{|fk〉}. Note that this argument does not extend to the knowledge of {λk}.
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Nevertheless, even just for {|fk〉} this argument contains a major gap, which is, in fact,
a general gap in the impossibility proof: it is not guaranteed that there is only one veryfing
measurement for the protocol. In the particular case of randomness described above, it
means that the split measurement of {|fk〉} of HB1 , and then a measurement on HB2 , is not
the verifying measurement of Π that has been proved susceptible to cheating as prescribed
by the impossibility proof. It is not true that whenever Π is verified on a cheating state,
then so is the split measurement. The cheating probability P¯Ac depends on the verifying
measurement. For an arbitrary protocol, the impossibility proof formulatoin does not, and,
in fact, cannot specify what the possible verifying measurements could be. There is no
proof given that there cannot be more than one verifying measurement, for which different
cheating transformations are needed. It turns out that for several types of protocols, though
not for all, I can prove that this is indeed the case in the sense (IP) of (7) for all perfectly
verifying measurements, i.e., measurements that yield the “yes” result with probability one
corresponding to the opening bit value.
However, condition (8), which is taken to be the ǫ-concealing condition in the impossi-
bility proof, is not a proper concealing condition due to the Libertarian Principle. Indeed,
while (8) implies that Adam can cheat according to the impossibility proof, the situation
is misrepresented in that it may be Babe who can actually cheat by using a different |Ψ〉.
Two examples are given in Ref. [16]. It makes no sense to insist that Babe has to stick to a
prescribed {λk}, in contradiction to the Secrecy Principle, so that the protocol is concealing
and Adam can cheat, while Babe can actually use a different {λk} and instead cheat suc-
cessfully herself. There is no reason for Babe to commit such bit suicide. For any protocol,
one cannot simply say that a protocol is now taken to be ǫ-concealing. One has to describe
quantitatively a necessary ǫ-concealing condition for the protocol before any meaningful per-
formance analysis can be made, which is something the impossibility proof fails to do in
general. Thus, there is no impossibility proof whenever anonymous states |Ψ〉 are used in a
protocol.
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Suppose that condition (9) is to be used, which is a sufficient condition that has not been
shown to be necessary for concealing, as to be discussed later. For a class of anonymous-state
protocols that are perfectly concealing, it may be shown [16, 19, 20] that the cheating UA
is independent of any {λk} and {|fk〉} in (2). The reason why secure protocols based on
classical random numbers alone are hard to construct is not necessarily because one forgets
quantum purification. It is because concealing under quantum purification is often more
restrictive than concealing under classical randomness, as in protocol QBCp2 or Example
1. We say that a protocol is of Type 3 whenever states of the form (2) are used by Babe.
An example is QBC3 of Ref. [16]. Under ǫ-concealing (9) for such protocols, it is not known
whether P¯Ac is close to one independently of {λk}. Thus, there is no impossibility proof if
(8) in a Type 0 protocol with (2) is replaced by (9) or just (10). For such Type 3 protocols,
unconditional security may arise in the following way. Since Adam does not know {λk}, one
may consider first a fixed {λk} and then average over all possible cheating UA. Such an
average cannot produce PAc ∼ 1. The performance analysis for the overall situation seems
rather involved, and new approaches may be needed to see whether security is actually
provable. A direct approach to the analysis of such protocols is given in Ref. [19]. However,
what we have here is actually a game-theoretic situation involving freedom on both sides
with opposing objectives with regard to the performance criteria PAc and P
B
c . It is most
appropriate to regard {λk}, {pi}, etc. as unknown with no meaningful distribution on them,
a situation that happens in many problems of classical statistics whenever there is a lack of
statistical regularity or meaningful ensemble, the situation we have here. See Appendix B
for further elaboration.
It is argued in [21] that {λk} has to be taken openly known in a meaningful protocol,
because there is no guarantee that it can be kept secret. In any cryptographic protocol, one
has to assume that anything one party does on her locality is not known to another party
in a distant locality, relativity or not, or else nothing can be a secret, including a secret key.
The issue is not why Adam does not know {λk}. It is why he would know. Indeed, one may
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use the same reasoning and assume Babe knows UA so she can defeat Adam’s cheating. The
actual situation is that {λk} is an unknown parameter in an infinite-dimensional space over
R or C, as discussed in Appendix B. The conclusion arrived at above can also be repeated
in this regard. Under proper concealing (9), there is no need for Adam to know {λk} in
accordance with the Secrecy Principle. There is no way Adam can find out which particular
{λk} Babe uses. It is entirely her private affair. Without (9), Babe is not going to commit
bit suicide with (8). She would use a different {λk} instead.
Generally, it is difficult to pin down a necessary condition for ǫ-concealing for an arbitrary
protocol without utilizing specific information about the protocol details. In fact, the very
meaning of concealing in an arbitrary protocol has to be decided upon. Thus, (9) may be
too strong because Babe in general does not know the distribution {pi} on Adam’s secret
parameter i. It may not be necessary for ǫ-concealing that ρB0
ǫ∼ ρB1 holds for any {pi}
due to averaging or to the game situation involving {λk} just discussed. Thus, a general
impossibility proof for Type 3 protocols would face the immediate obstacle of not being
able to specify quantitatively either a necessary ǫ-concealing or ǫ-binding condition. One
the other hand, security proof for a particular protocol is much easier because sufficient
conditons and protocol mechanism can be specifically exploited.
We summarize the main points concerning random numbers.
1. Classical randomness is not generally reducible to quantum uncertainty.
2. The condition of ǫ-concealing with random numbers is not equivalent to its quantum
purification version, i.e., (8) is not equivalent to (10).
3. The coefficients {λk} in the quantum purification (2) are generally not known to the
other party.
4. The concealing condition (8) used in the impossibility proof is, in general, neither
necessary nor sufficient for concealing.
5. There is no general impossibility proof when anonymous states are involved in a pro-
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tocol.
6. With random k and i, it is difficult to formulate a necessary ǫ-concealing or ǫ-binding
condition in order to start an impossibility proof.
7. The general situation of an unspecified protocol, even the simple case (1), is game-
theoretic.
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9 Too many possible questions to entangle: Type 4
protocols
In Type 4 protocols, the unentangled state |φbi〉 is brought about from the entangled openly
known |Φb〉 through the asking of questions related to the evidence by Babe. As a con-
sequence, one arrives at the situation discussed at the beginning of Section 3, where the
randomness that makes up ρB
b
is not entangled under Adam. The ideas and procedure are
best explained for the specific case of protocol QBC4 in the following.
Adam sends Babe a sequence of n qubits, each in either one of {|φ〉, |φ′〉}, such that
an even number of |φ′〉 corresponds to b = 0, and an odd number to b = 1. As shown in
Appendix C, the protocol is ǫ-concealing for large n for any |〈φ|φ′〉|2 = ǫ1, and Adam has
the usual EPR cheat with the entanglement
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|ei〉|φ0i〉 (12)
for pi = 1/2
n−1. It was suggested in v2 of this paper ( quant-ph/0207089v2 ) that Babe now
asks Adam to reveal to her n − n0 qubits, randomly selected out of n, with n0 remaining
ones sufficient to ensure ǫ-concealing. The idea is to force him to measure the {|ei〉} in
(12) to pin down a specific |φ0i〉, thus destroying the entanglement. However, Adam can
respond as follows. Let i = (i1, . . . , in), il ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |φ0i〉 = |φ0i1〉 . . . |φ0in〉,
|φ0il〉 ∈ {|φ〉, |φ′〉} in each Kl2, HB =
⊗
lKl2. Then |Φ0〉 can be extended through local
operation to
|Φ′0〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|i1〉 . . . |in〉|ei〉|φ0i〉 (13)
in HA′⊗HA⊗HB, HA′ =⊗nl=1Hl2 a product of qubits, and 〈il = 0|il = 1〉 = 0 for each l are
two orthogonal states from the BB84 state set S0 on a fixed great circle C of each qubit, with
|il = 0〉 corresponding to |φ〉 and |il = 1〉 to |φ′〉. In response to Babe’s question on a subset
S ⊂ {i1, . . . , in}, |S| = n−n0, Adam sends Babe the state spaces Hl2 for all l ∈ S. Babe can
measure on
⊗
l∈SHl2 to find the answer to her question and verify on the committed {|φ0il〉}
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in Kl2’s. Since the protocol is concealing with Babe posessing HB ⊗
(⊗
l∈SHl2
)
and Adam
possessing HA′ ≡ HA ⊗ (⊗l∈Sc Hl2
)
, Sc = {1, . . . , n} − S, Adam can cheat successfully by
finding the proper cheating transformation UA
′
on HA′.
Following our same idea, the protocol is now extended as follows. Babe may ask Adam
to do the following instead. He is going to provide Babe with the |il〉 for all l, but with each
|il〉 turned with probability 1/2 on the great circle C to the other two orthogonal BB84
states for b = 0 and b = 1. That is, with S0 = {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉} where 〈1|3〉 = 〈2|4〉 = 0, the
|il〉 is equally probable to be {|1〉, |2〉} for a |φ〉, and {|3〉, |4〉} for a |φ′〉. The distribution
would be across the n |il〉’s. It is easy to see, as shown in Appendix C, that the protocol
remains ǫ-concealing for any ǫ1 by making n0 sufficiently large. Now Babe asks Adam to
reveal a random set of n − n0 |il〉’s and verifies them on her corresponding |φ0il〉’s, making
sure that all states in S0 appear within, say, the Chernov bound limit. Since Adam has not
entangled over the above randomness, from his point of view ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are not close at all.
Let F be the Uhlmann fidelity tr
√
(ρB
0
)1/2ρB
1
(ρB
0
)1/2 between ρB
0
and ρB
1
under (12), and F ′
for the situation just described. It is difficult to evaluate F ′, but one can bound it loosely
by F ′ ≤ 1√
2
F from the fact that one has (13) now with a single tensor product extension
⊗
l |il〉 for each |φ0i〉 constructed from S0. The factor 1√2 comes from the largest value of a
single overlap 〈il = 0|il = 1〉, the minimum between |φ0i〉 and |φ1j〉. From (C.7) in Appendix
C, Adam’s optimal cheating probability satisfies P¯Ac ≤ FA(ρB0 , ρB1 ) with FA computed from
his point of view. Thus, we have arrived at P¯Ac ≤ 1√2 , contradicting the impossibility proof
assertion (IP) of (7). By utilizing this scheme repeatedly, one may obtain an unconditionally
secure protocol, as in the way described in QBC2 of [15]. However, we can also achieve
unconditional security as follows.
Babe now asks Adam to present |il〉 in two equally probable states {|1〉, |5〉} with |5〉 =
R(θ)|1〉 for |φ〉 or il = 0, and in {|3〉, |6〉} with |6〉 = R(θ)|3〉 for |φ′〉 or il = 1. The angle θ is
chosen so small that the overlap 〈5|3〉 is ǫ instead of 1√
2
in the case of S0. Thus P¯
A
c ≤ ǫ, while
P¯Bc can still be made ≤ ǫ by having n0 sufficiently large. Babe would ask Adam to reveal
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n− n0 of these |il〉’s and verify them as above. Adam’s probability of successful cheating by
whatever action is exponentially small in n − n0, but we do not need to quantify it under
the assumption he needs to open perfectly for b = 0. That would only occur if he measures
{|ei〉} in (13) to answer. Babe can even postpone the measurement to the verification phase.
Adam cannot change (13) to one that allows him to cheat from pre-entanglement on an-
swers to the questions, due to local state invariance as follows. Consider just the pair of qubit
states at the same lth position |il〉|φ0il〉 with all other qubits fixed. When a measurement of
{|1〉, |3〉} is performed on Hl2, the state on Kl2 is a superposition of |φ〉〈φ| and |φ′〉〈φ′| under
(13) when averaged over the measurement results. If the |il〉 is entangled to |φ0il〉 over all
four states in S0 or {|1〉, |5〉, |3〉, |6〉} in the required form
4∑
il=1
|il〉|φ0il〉 (14)
with the proper matching |φ0il〉, such a measurement would produce a state on Kl2 with non-
vanishing interference terms |φ〉〈φ′|, |φ′〉〈φ| that can be easily computed. No local operation
on HA′ can change the state of Kl2 this way, as a consequence of local state invariance stated
in Appendix C. Intuitively, it is clear that Adam cannot entangle on top of entanglement.
Mathematically, he can extend (13) as a tensor product, but not as a direct sum.
More generally, Babe can ask Adam to present his answers for each qubit in any coded
form in one qubit, two qubits, or m qubits. She can adjoin an integer m to precede i in the
binary representation with m + i bits, present Adam with her secretly chosen computable
and invertible arithmetical function f : N → {0, 1}, and ask for the answer f({m, i}). If
Adam is honest and submitted unentangled |φ0i〉, he could answer straightforwardly. With
his entanglement, he could do the quantum computation in
|Φ′
0
〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|f({m, i})〉|ei〉|φ0i〉, (15)
passing HA′ with state |f({m, i})〉 to Babe. Babe can ask for presentations as in the parity
case above. Indeed, the possibilities of presenting the individual parity answers in different
spaces alone lead to an infinite set of possible questions of arbitrarily large cardinality.
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To be able to cheat under such open questioning, Adam has to pre-entangle the answer to
every possible question. However, he can only pre-entangle the answers to a finite number of
questions. Indeed, even if he pre-entangles an infinite number, he cannot locate the answer
by an algorithm, say the set of Turing-computable functions alone is already not recursively
enumerable. For the parity function, Babe can ask questions involving subset parities on the
n qubits, already generating 2n types of questions that is too many to entangle for n > 410
even if one can use all the physical resources in the Universe. See Appendix D for this
physical limit.
As elaborated in Appendix B and in Sections 3-5, Babe can automatize a secretly chosen
rule to specify the questions she may ask. If one wants to talk about probability, it is fair
to say that the probability her question was pre-entangled by Adam is arbitrarily small.
Alternatively, to avoid unfruitful terminological debate, one may just say that Adam can
cheat if Babe’s questions drawn from an infinite set fall under Adam’s finite set of pre-
entangled questions. This situation was not realized before, and serves effectively to produce
an unconditionally secure protocol. It may be emphasized that if |Φb〉 is openly known,
Babe can always ask a further question that is not pre-entangled in it, thus rendering it
unentangled, as discussed above.
PROTOCOL QBC4
(i) Adam sends Babe a sequence of n qubits, each being either one of
{|φ〉, |φ′〉}, such that an even number of |φ′〉’s corresponds to b = 0,
and an odd number to b = 1.
(ii) Babe asks Adam questions that are sufficient to pin down the total
committed state, requiring him to present his answers in a specific
randomized form.
(iii) Babe verifies some of the answers by further questions on how Adam
actually randomized them.
(iv) Adam opens by revealing all the unknown states to Babe. She verifies
by corresponding measurements.
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This protocol bears a resemblance to a Type 3 protocol, in which Babe uses a parameter
unknown to Adam. The difference is that an additional technique, an open questioning of
evidence, is used to guarantee ǫ-concealing for each unknown value that would require a
different cheating arrangement by Adam, something that is difficult to achieve by means
of anonymous states alone. Also, there is no discrete approximation to the infinite set of
possibilities in this case, in contrast to the probabilities {λk}. Furthermore, when Adam
misses the value, his cheating probability is vanishingly small, in constrast to a mistmath
between UA and {λk}.
To recapitulate the logic of Type 4 protocols: by asking open questions concerning the
evidence with answers presented in a specific randomized form chosen secretly by her, Babe
ensures that Adam can only cheat successfully by pre-entangling the whole question correctly.
However, he can do that only with a vanishingly small probability. It is appropriate to
emphasize that this type of protocols shows that, other than unknown parameters, the
specifics of a protocol may play a significant role in rendering untenable the assertion that
an openly known |Φb〉 is obtained at the end of commitment. This issue has not been
adequately addressed in the impossibility proof.
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10 Summary and conclusion
If there is a general impossibility proof for secure QBC, one should be able to apply it
schematically to any proposed QBC protocol to show that it is insecure. This often cannot
be done. The reason is that the impossibility proof formulation is quite restrictive, and many
nontrivial details in a systematic proof have not been spelled out. Some such criticisms have
already been discussed in Ref. [15], but they are analyzed quantitatively in this paper.
We introduced several new techniques for protocol design, not covered by the impossibility
proof formulation which only applies to what we call Type 0 protocols. We presented three
new types of protocols:
• Type 1 — measurement for cheating detection,
• Type 2 — shifting of evidence state spaces,
• Type 3 — utilization of anonymous states,
• Type 4 — open questioning of evidence.
A specific Type 4 protocol, QBC4, is proved unconditionally secure. We indicateed how
a Type 1 protocol, QBC1, and a Type 2 protocol, QBC2A, may be proved secure. The
situation is yet undecided for Type 3 protocols. There is no impossibility proof, but there
is no protocol which is clearly secure either. A general theory of quantum statistical games
needs to be developed for addressing many such QBC problems in a satisfactory manner.
The content of this paper hopefully makes clear the vast richness of this subject yet
to be uncovered, especially for protocols that can be practically implemented in a realistic
environment.
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Appendix A: no impossibility theorem without QBC
definition
It is generally believed by mathematicians that a mathematical theorem can only be obtained
from precise mathematical definitions. In the impossibility proof of trisecting the angle
π/3 by straightedge and compass only, for example, the action of these two instruments is
precisely captured mathematically by a quadratic extension field of the rational numbers. Do
we need a definition of a QBC protocol to have a theorem which says that unconditionally
secure QBC is impossible? After all, E. Witten got a Fields Medal in mathematics for work
that made essential use of the Feynman path integral that M. Atiyah, a former Fields medalist
and judge on the medal’s decision panel, commented: “... provided one believes that the
integral makes sense,” to which Witten had the reply: ”We have forty years of experience of
computing these types of integrals” [22]. Regardless of one’s opinion concerning the Feynman
path integral (which, I think, is one of the greatest scientific creations), it is not similar to
a QBC protocol which, unlike the path integral, has no definite expression that could serve
as a starting point.
A closer analogy to a QBC protocol is an “effectively computable” function, a function
whose value for any specific argument can be “mechanically” obtained in a finite number
of steps without the intervention of “intelligence.” The well-known Church-Turing thesis
says that any effectively computable function can be computed recursively or by a Turing
machine. It can be cast as an impossibility statement: there is no effective procedure that
cannot be simulated by a Turing machine. It was found that a function that can be computed
by a method that is clearly effective, such as Post machines and Markov algorithms, is indeed
also Turing-computable. However, nobody calls the Church-Turing thesis the Church-Turing
theorem. This is because there is no mathematical definition of an effective procedure. The
logical possibility is open that someday a procedure is found that is intuitively or even
physically effective, but which can compute a nonrecursive arithmetical function.
Thus, in the absence of a precise definition of a QBC protocol, one would have at best
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an “impossibility thesis,” not an impossibility theorem. (This view was emphasized to the
author by Masanao Ozawa.) This concern about definition is not scholasticism. There
is no definition that would characterize all classical cryptographic protocols, say for bit
commitment, partly because, I believe, of the open possibilities described in Section 5 of
this paper. It is at least not clear why a definition in the more general quantum case can
ever be found. Just as there appear to be many different forms of effective procedures, there
are many different QBC protocol types that appear not to be captured by the impossibility
proof formulation. To uphold just the “impossibility thesis,” one would need to prove that
unconditionally secure QBC is impossible in each of these types — four of them are given
in this paper. My contention is that not only is there no impossibility proof for these four
types, but in fact unconditional security can be obtained in at least three of them.
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Appendix B: unknown versus random parameters and
“Church of the Larger Hilbert Space”
A considerable amount of confusion surrounds the equivalence between the use of classical
random numbers and their quantum entanglement purification via the doctrine of “Church of
the Larger Hilbert Space,” which is employed in various subareas of quantum information and
quantum cryptography. There is also confusion about whether there exists a secret parameter
with no probability distribution that can nevertheless be automatized by a machine. These
questions are tangled up with a basic assumption or assertion of the impossibility proof that,
in any QBC protocol, there is a publicly known pure state |Φ〉 to start with, which results in a
publicly known |Φb〉 at the end of commitment, connected to |Φ〉 by a publicly known unitary
transformation. In this Appendix, we will show that in the making of a QBC cryptographic
system, some external agent is always involved, and the system is always open; thus, the
above assertion is untenable. In the process, we hope to bring out some clear demarcations
that would dispel various confusions.
To begin with, not every unknown parameter can be, or should be, modelled as a random
variable for different reasons, which is well-known in classical statistics. One reason is the
impossibility of assigning probabilities to an infinite sample space in some situations, such as
a uniformly distributed random variable with the values in the positive integers N or the real
numbers R, and similarly on general countably infinite or uncountable spaces. This situation
occurs in QBC4 of Section 9, when the space of all possible actions is of arbitrarily large
cardinality, or, say, just |N|, even though everything is finite to start with. A second reason is
that there may be no meaningful ensemble for the parameter r, which should be just left as an
unknown parameter to be drawn from a given set, finite or infinite. This happens in various
circumstances, such as the measurement of a physical (say, astronomical) characteristic that
takes on a fixed value to be estimated. Such estimation of an unknown parameter without
the use of a priori information on its distribution is, in fact, very common. In quantum
teleportation, one talks about the fidelity of receiving a state |ψ〉 of a qubit that is just
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unknown, not with respect to any uniform distribution, so that an ensemble is described by
the density operator I/2. The ensemble is, rather, |ψ〉, |ψ〉, . . . , and the scheme is supposed
to work for any |ψ〉, not on I/2. A third reason is that often r is subjected to the control
and decision of an agent, and no probability distribution has a meaning in terms of relative
frequency, as it may have in other cases. Indeed, the frequency interpretation of probability
has been rejected from the beginning in decision theory [23], for applications to which the
“subjective” interpretations are more meaningful. Not only may r be used only once, but
also the controlling agent may use it repeatedly (i.e., r, r, . . . ) in an actual ensemble once it
is decided upon. There is no actual ensemble that yields r1, r2, . . . according to whatever
probability distribution.
This last situation happens in the use of anonymous states in a QBC protocol. Suppose
Babe generates (2) instead of |ψk〉 in an entanglement purification. The state of HB1 or
HB1 ⊗ HB2 is anonymous to Adam because he does not know exactly what it is — Babe
has the freedom to choose λk in (2). According to the Secrecy Principle of Section 5,
under a proper concealing condition she can pick {λk} with any rule made up by her and
unknown to Adam, either for one use or in repeated uses of (2) for a sequence of different bit
commitments. In such a sequence, she can use exactly the same value, or use different values
generated according to the parameters decided by another value. For example, assuming all
possible {λk} form a finite set, she can pick one randomly and stick to it in a sequence of
commitments. This can clearly be automatized, and the result does not appear to Adam as
an ensemble with a distribution {λk}, but rather as an “ensemble” with one fixed unknown
{λk}.
Now we are led to the equivalence between random numbers and their quantum purifi-
cations. I assert that the following sequence of states generated by random numbers with
probability {λk} in HB1 ,
φ1, . . . , φl, . . . |φl〉 ∈ {|ψk〉} (B.1)
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is different from the HB1 states in the sequence obtained by the purification Ψ of (2):
Φ1, . . . ,Φl, . . . |Φ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉|fk〉, (B.2)
where |Φl〉 = |Φ〉 for every l. In a specific instance φl of (B.1) there is no average over
{|ψk〉}, but there is always such an average for each Φl. Under (B.2), which can be used
for cheating in the form (1), the agent controlling HB2 of (2) or HA of (1) can select a
preferred ensemble in HB1 or HB, which makes EPR cheating possible. On the other hand,
the ensemble in (B.1) is fixed and cannot be changed. Quantum entanglement is a physical
resource that needs to be established. Not all randomness is reducible to that of quantum
entanglement†. Indeed, (B.1) does not allow EPR cheating. This is the situation in QBC4,
created through Babe’s questioning on Adam’s measurement purification states. Note that
the agent controlling (B.1) or (B.2) may choose to generate any ψk on the φl’s or Φl’s. This
situation with unknown parameters is also relevant to our Type 3 protocols.
The above difference can be rephrased as follows. In the density operator expansion
ρ =
∑
k
λk|ψk〉〈ψk|, (B.3)
the randomness in k may come from a variety of sources. If all of it comes from quantum
entanglement, then (2) applies, and the agent controlling HB2 can select the ensemble in
HB1 . If some of it comes from elsewhere, it would not be equivalent to (2), and ensemble
selection or entanglement cheating is limited or becomes impossible, depending on the exact
form of the joint state. The occurrence of such non-entanglement randomness is always
possible because the system is subject to intervention by agents. In any meaningful and
realistic formulation of the problem, the agents’ possible actions are infinitely varying and
open. They cannot be described as a public |Φ〉 being transformed in a closed system to
another public |Φb〉. Indeed, for QBC there is in general a game-theoretic situation, where
both parties can choose actions unknown to the other party.
†Note that even if it is, an agent can cheat only if he controls HB2 in (2).
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Appendix C: protocol QBC4
Here we fill in certain mathematical details on QBC4. We consider first the case when Babe
asks no question on the evidence.
Adam can guarantee concealing by using uniform probability 1/2n−1 for each sequence of
either parity. In that case, ρB
0
−ρB
1
factorizes into products of individual qubit parts. Let j =
{j1, . . . , jn} ∈ {0, 1}n, Pl0 = |φ〉〈φ|, Pl1 = |φ′〉〈φ′|, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Λ0 = {j|
⊕n
l=1 jl = 0},
Λ1 = {j|
⊕n
l=1 jl = 1} be the even- and odd-parity n-bit sets. Then
ρB
b
=
1
2n−1
∑
j∈Λb
n⊗
l=1
Pljl, b ∈ {0, 1} , (C.1)
and so
ρB
0
− ρB
1
=
1
2n−1
n⊗
l=1
(Pl0 − Pl1) . (C.2)
Thus, Babe’s optimum quantum decision reduces to optimally discriminating between |φ〉
and |φ′〉 for each qubit individually, and then seeing whether there is an even or odd number
of |φ′〉’s. the optimum error probability pe for each qubit is well-known [24, 15],
pe =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− |〈φ|φ′〉|2. (C.3)
The optimum error probability P¯Bc of correct bit decision on the sequence is, from the even
and odd binomial sums, given by
P¯Bc =
1
2
+
1
2
(1− 2pe)n . (C.4)
Thus P¯Bc is close to 1/2 exponentially in n independently of 1/2 ≥ pe > 0.
After committing |Φ0〉, Adam can still try to cheat with the {|ei〉} measurement by
declaring one qubit to be in a state different from the actual one. the probability of success
is PAc = |〈φ|φ′〉|2 ≡ ǫ1, a design parameter of the protocol. It can be made ǫ-concealing by
choosing
|〈φ|φ′〉|2 ≡ ǫ1 ≤ ǫ (C.5)
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and, from (C.4), choosing n0 to satisfy
(1− ǫ1)n0 ≤ 4ǫ2 . (C.6)
When Adam presents the additional |il〉’s in S0 or other sets, Babe’s density operator
ρB0 is diagonal, similar to (B.2), in the basis that diagonalizes each pair Hl2 ⊗ Kl2. Her
optimum decision reduces to optimally discriminating between the two density operators
corresponding to il = 0 and il = 1 for each of these n pairs, and then choosing the total
resulting parity from the n decisions. Thus, P¯Bc is given by (C.4) with pe given by the
optimum pair decision, which just yields a different function of ǫ1 from (C.3). For any fixed
ǫ1, P¯
B
c can be made smaller than any ǫ as in (C.6) with a large enough n0.
The following theorem characterizes Adam’s optimal probability of cheating P¯Ac when
|Φ0〉 of (1) is used with resulting ρBb and F between them.
Theorem
F 2 ≤ P¯Ac ≤ F. (C.7)
The bounds (C.7) are identical to (21) for P˜Ac in Ref. [16]. It can be seen from Appendix A,
(6), and (18) of [16] that actually P˜Ac = P¯
A
c .
The following theorem [15] is also used in Section 9.
Theorem (local state invariance). Let ρAB be a state on HA⊗HB with ρB ≡ trAρAB. The
state ρB remains invariant under any quantum operation on HA alone.
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Appendix D: physical limits and unconditional security
In cryptography, a system is typcally called unconditionally secure if it cannot be broken
with infinite computational power, i.e., its security is not based on computational complexity
of any kind. In quantum cryptography, the system’s security depends on the validity of the
laws of quantum physics and not on the limits of computational power, so this security is
unconditional. More broadly, one can say that in physical cryptography, the system’s security
is based on facts of our physical world which are immutable, and hence is unconditional also.
Indeed, the laws of physics are part of the facts of Nature, which include both the laws and
the initial conditions of the Universe that give rise to the world we live in. For example, we
can exploit and utilize the background radiation from the sun or even the cosmos, because
they are always there, not removable by any technological advance. Such physical limits
are fundamentally different from ones that arise from computational complexity, quantum
or classical.
Similarly, there are facts of nature that impose physical limits on the possible number of
qubits one may use in entanglement. What may be surprising is that the number so limited
is small on just an exponential scale. By various estimates, the total number of elementary
fermions in the world is <∼10
89 < 2400 [25]. If E1 is the energy range available with separation
∆E ∼ ~/∆t, taking ∆t to be the age of the Universe (< 240 sec.), the total number of qubits
available with energy E1 is 2
400 log E1∆t
~
<
∼2
410. For the boson electromagnetic field with total
energy E2, the number of qubits available is ∆t log
E2
∆τ~
from the bit capacity of a boson field
[26, 27]. Taking τ to be the Planck time 10−44 sec and E2 the total electromagnetic radiation
energy in the Universe [25], this yields < 2380 qubits. Thus, one can entangle no more than
∼ 2410 binary possibilities.
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